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THE PRICE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION
AND WHO PAYS
1. Michael Borrero
Associate Professor
University of Connecticut
School of Social Work
The Employment vs. Inflation Debate
Since the early 1960's many economists and policy
makers have contended that full employment and price
stability are unattainable goals. Stimulated by the
works of A. W. Phillips, a British economist, they have
argued that there is an inverse relationship between
inflation and unemployment; that is, as unemployment
decreases, inflation increases. Phillips in his origi-
nal article, "The Relationship between Unemployment and
the Rate of Change in Money Wage Rates in the United
Kingdom,"1 cautiously reasoned that when demand for
commodities, services or labor was high relative to
supply, prices increase. Increasing prices for labor
draw out unemployed people into the labor market. The
more people that are drawn out of unemployment, the
higher the wages and the higher the total spending.
Conversely, when demand for commodities, services or
labor was low, relative to supply, prices decreased.
Decreasing prices in commodities and services usually
result in higher unemployment, because of "lay-offs."
Decreasing prices for labor do make workers reluctant
to enter the market for less than the prevailing rates
when demand is low and unemployment is high. Conse-
quently total spending is reduced. Based on the
analysis of his data, Phillips hypothesized that as
unemployment increased wages tended to decrease.
Although Phillips spoke of the relationship bet-
ween wages and unemployment, the connection between
wages and prices is quite direct: periods of high
enployment stimulate higher wages which in turn in-
crease business operating costs. These increases in
cost are passed on to the consumer in terms of higher
prices. Consequently, during periods of high employ-
ment prices tend to increase and vise versa. In
short, there appears to be a trade-off between
inflation and unemployment. This simple but powerful
piece of research has influenced many policy makers all
over the world. The Phillips curve, as this relation-
ship is called, has had, and continues to have profound
economic, political and social implications as we shall
shortly see.
By no means is the Phillips curve noncontroversial
or fully accepted. Many economists, policy makers and
lay persons refute the notion of a trade-off between
unemployment and inflation. Some critics, on the basis
of their studies, argue that the foundation of the
trade-off thesis is based on classical price theory, a
theory which no longer explains market pricing because
of the lack of competition in the market.2 A frequent
example used, although there are many others, 3 occurred
during 1975 when demand for United States made auto-
mobiles decreased, but prices for these automobiles
actually increased by about $1,000 per car. This
happened because the falling demand increased the per
unit cost of production. Large oligopolies must com-
pensate for a drop in demand by increasing prices to
meet cost and maintain target or projected profit
levels. Given the concentration of large corporations
in the economy and the lack of competition, prices rise
at the will of large firms, in spite of the demand and
employment or unemployment situation. Thus the causes
of inflation are more complex and require action on
several levels and fronts. 4
Other studies have shown that the inflation-unem-
ployment thesis is too simple and does not account for
external factors which influence our economy, e.g., oil
embargo, devaluation of the dollar, foreign imports,
grain sales, etc. For example, in 1974, because of the
oil extortion and the grain deal, food prices accounted
for about half of the inflation increase.5
Another argument commonly heard against the
Phillips curve, is that the actual inverse relation-
ship data does not hold true for the United States in
recent years. Figure 1 presents data for inflation
and unemployment,6 and what has come to be known as
stagflation.7 This empirical data does not support,
statistically, an inverse relationship between un-
employment and inflation.
Finally, and by no means have all the opposing
arguments and findings been covered, Bach argues that
consumers and business have come to anticipate in-
flation and by doing so, have increased the inflation
rate by their spending habits, irrespective of
unemployment rates.
In a world of excess income claims and
government insertion of new money to
avoid (reduce) unemployment, everyone
will come to understand the inflationary
process or, at least, to anticipate con-
tinued inflation. Thus wage earners,
businessmen, borrowers, lenders--all the
participants in the economic process--
will begin to build inflation anticipations
into bargains on wages, prices and interest
rates on loans. But once they do, the
government's power to reduce unemployment
by government spending of new money is
undercut. The main way expansionary
government monetary-fiscal policy creates
more jobs is by expanding demand, which
induces businesses to hire more workers.
But if workers push up wage costs as
fast as demand increases and prices rise,
businesses have no incentive to expand
output and hire more workers. The
result is simply higher wages, costs, and
prices all around, but no more jobs. And
the more government spends to reduce
unemployment, and more inflationary
expectations will rise and the more in-
flation will occur, without more than
temporarily reducing unemployment.8
These then are some of the major findings in opposition
to the inflation-unemployment thesis. They are respon-
sible works which have been substantively developed by
respectable economists and policy analysts. Yet, the
impact which these findings have had on changing
economic policy or many peoples' minds about the
Phillips curve has been nil.
Figure 1
CHANGES IN CONSUMER PRICES AND
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR THE
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Why have we as a nation carried out our economic
policies during the past two decades on the basis of a
theory which is at best only partially valid? The
answer to this question lies in the economic, political,
social and moral arena of our society. It concerns a
redistribution of resources, a reallocation of status,
and a redefinition of group and personal relationship. 9
Because ultimately, behind the theoretical analysis of
the inflation-unemployment tradeoff is the real issue
of cost, and who shall pay the greater burden of the
cost. The following analysis will attempt to elucidate
these costs.
Inflation
During periods of high inflation everyone in
society is affected, but in different ways. Not too
many years ago it was conventional wisdom that
inflation was bad because it affected those least able
to afford it: the poor and persons on fixed incomes.
While this was, and still is, true it is only half of
the truth. Inflation affects the non-poor and business
firms also, but in different ways. During his infla-
tionary periods, the poor and people on fixed incomes
spend a greater percentage of their income on basic
needs--food, shelter, clothing, etc. Consequently,
they have less additional money for other necessities.
As prices continue to increase they begin to substitute
and often eliminate some goods and services; this
situation creates great hardships. The non-poor and
business firms do not face such hardships of having to
substitute or eliminate basic necessities; though they
too have to pay more for their basic needs and
business costs. A major difference is that they have
additional resources, income, savings, etc., which
they can use, if they wish to continue their standard
of living or business operations. The poor and per-
sons on fixed incomes generally do not have additional
resources; they must make do with their incomes,
pensions, or welfare allowances. If these are not
enough, they must go without, beg, borrow or steal.
On the other hand, during periods of high infla-
tion, savers, lenders, some investors and many
corporate firms lose large sums of money in terms of
real income and returns on interest rates. Generally
speaking the more money that is tied up in savings,
loans or production just prior to an increase in in-
flation, the greater the loss of real money value.
This was the case during 1973 and 1974 when inflation
nearly doubled each year. For example, a lending in-
stitution which in 1972 made a single loan for $100,000,
to be paid back in two years at 7% interest and in 1973
and 1974 inflation increased 3% and 6% respectively,
from a previous 3% annual rate, lost approximately
$6,400 in two years. Put more dramatically, the anti-
cipated returns when the loan was first issued was
$10,500 in two years. The actual returns with the in-
crease of inflation was $4,100, a loss of over 50% on
this one loan.
By reversing this example to apply to an investor,
say a person with a savings account, we can also see
how inflation is a costly matter. Suppose that a per-
son or firm had $100,000 invested and was receiving a
7% annual interest return. During the first year,
using the above 3% and 6% inflation rate increases,
this investor is really only receiving 4% returns or
losing $3,000 in interest. In the second year, this
investor is only receiving a 1% return and losing
$6,000 in returns - a total of $9,000 in two years.
Multiplying these two examples by the thousands
of lending institutions and the millions of loans they
make and the millions of investors, one can see that
inflation is a very costly matter. It is for this
reason that entrepreneurs do not favor inflation:
they simply stand to lose large sums of profits and
real income.* For this reason, it will not be surpris-
ing to hear about a "fluctuating interest rate" tied
to an inflation indicator. This will be a safeguard
against inflation losses if the inflation rate should
increase. In fact, this practice is now common with
many lending institutions. The net consequence of
this practice is a guaranteed profit margin to lenders.
It should also be pointed out that during his infla-
tionary periods, borrowers fare better than lenders,
in that they are paying back loans at a lower value
rate than they originally borrowed.
This also means that the traditional justification of
profit due to risk taking is no longer valid since with
the fluctuating interest rate tied to inflation, there
is no risk, in terms of returns, involved.
It should also be pointed out that with fluctuat-
ing interest rates, interest payments would be lowered
when inflation decreases. Nevertheless, the above con-
sequence still stands.
Unemployment
Just as inflation affects everyone in society, so
does unemployment; though again, the consequences
affect different groups differently. It is common
knowledge and a matter of fact that unemployment
affects members of minority groups, the young, the
elderly, and women disproportionately.
The ratio of unemployment for members of these
groups is 2:1 and even 3:1 among labor force partici-
pants. It is also common knowledge that the actual un-
enployment rate of these groups is double and triple
that of the official reported figures. Prolonged un-
employment for members of these groups often means
exhausting any possible savings, borrowing from re-
latives and friends, selling personal belongings,
going on public assistance, increase family conflicts,
loss of personal pride, self-worth, self-respect, and
an overwhelming sense of uselessness. The road from
unemployment to humiliation to poverty to alienation
is well documented.* What is not well documented
is how unemployment affects everyone, even the
employed.
The costs of unemployment to society are extreme-
ly high and quite often invisible. Unemployment is a
very costly social problem which we all pay for,
whether we like it or not. We pay billions of dollars
annually for unemployment in terms of lost production
of goods and services; a loss which could never be re-
covered. A decrease in production due to unemployment
See Michael Borrero, "The Emotional and Psychological
Impact of Unemployment," in this Volume.
means fewer tax revenue dollars being collected,
while at the same time an increase in expenditures for
social programs. As unemployment increases so do the
expenditures for unemployment insurance, aid to de-
pendent families, food stamps, medicaid, general assis-
tance, psychiatric hospitalization, penal rehabilita-
tion, employment training programs, to name but a few
of the more visible costs. If we were to figure out
the opportunity cost involved in just these few pro-
grams the cost would be staggering.
We pay for unemployment in terms of increases in
crimes, suicides, emotional disturbances, mortalities,
juvenile delinquency, alcoholism, and violence against
women and children. We pay in terms of family deteri-
oration, greater conflict between parents and children
and spouses; even the children of the unemployed have
been found to achieve less in school. But perhaps the
greatest price we all pay for unemployment is the tre-
mendous waste of human creativity and productivity.
To deprive a person of work, in an age when personal
meaning, identity and one's self-worth are derived from
work, it is to deprive one from belonging to the com-
munity and society. Such denial of active membership
can only lead to greater hostilities toward those who
are withholding full social participation.
Dealing with The Dilemma
There seems little doubt that behind the choice
between lrice stability and full employment or un-
employmen: and inflation, is the concept of cost and
the assumption that the cost of high levels of unem-
ployment is a lower and lesser price for society to
pay than is the cost for high rates of inflation. The
reasoning behind this concept is not difficult to
figure out: while inflation affects everyone, it
affects most, in monetary terms, those persons and
groups with greater monetary assets, large corpora-
tions, lending institutions, wealthy individuals, etc.
Unemployment, while it too affects everyone, it
mainly affects the employment vulnerable: ethnic
minorities, the young, women and the elderly. It is
not difficult to see that a result of a price
stability policy perpetuates racism, sexism, and the
oppression of the young and elderly. It is a policy
the protects the economically and politically powerful
at the expense of the economically and politically weak.
It is also clear that a full employment policy at
a 1% or 2% level given our market and corporate
structure, e.g., lack of competition and market mono-
polities, etc., would create very high levels of
inflation. Our economic and political policies in
dealing with the unemployment-inflation dilemma have
been merely reactionary and see-saw like: when
inflation is "too high" we cool down the economy which
means increased levels of unemployment; conversely,
when unemployment is "too high" we stimulate the
economy by pumping more money and consequently more
jobs. And so continues our see-saw economic and poli-
tical policies; we merely release the pressure valve
when the steam gets too "high."
There are other alternatives to deal with this
dilemma, though they too have their problems. For
example, dismantling our oligopolies and monopolies
would create greater competition, more jobs, more
investments, greater efficiency, probably greater dis-
tribution of wealth, lower prices and not necessarily
higher inflation. This, however, would be taking on
the muscle of capitalism and the threat of corporate
dissertion. We could attempt again, a more strategic
plan and enforcement of price and wage controls. The
goal here would be to reach a better balance between
unemployment and inflation; that is, to achieve lower
levels of unemployment and inflation. However, wage
and price control is not a popular idea, let alone a
practice. It contradicts free enterprise and it is
difficult and costly to enforce. Finally, we could
attempt some combination of the above. We could dis-
mantle many conglomerates, oligopolies and monopolies,
and in those areas which this is not feasible, we
could develop stringent, clear and enforceable wage
and price controls. Thus, it appears that unless and
until we change our market and corporate structure,
our economic policies will merely continue to be re-
active rather than pro-active, "see-saw like," and
those policies will not address the fundamental issues
and problems identified in this paper.
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